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U
it AM HONORED to have the opportunity to
give the Homer Jones Memorial Lecture. In
remembering him today, I pay tribute to his
contributions to monetary policy making and to
quantitative monetary research in his capacity
as director of research at the St. Louis Fed. I
got to know Homer during the period of his
membership in the Shadow Open Market Com-
mittee. At our meetings he was diffident about
his knowledge and insistent on scrupulous at-
tention to statistical evidence as backing for the
policy conclusions we reached. I cannot think of
two more admirable qualities in an economist. It
was a privilege for me to have had this associa-
tion with Homer.
In 1925 the Federal Reserve Board collected
data on the number of member banks continu-
ously indebted to their Reserve Banks for at
least a year. As of August 31, 1925, 593 mem-
ber banks had been borrowing for a year or
more. Of this number, 239 had been borrowing
since 1920 and 122 had begun borrowing before
that. The Fed guessed that at least 80 percent of
the 259 national member banks that had failed
since 1920 had been “habitual borrowers” prior
to their failure. Of 457 continuous borrowers in
1926, 41 banks suspended operations in 1927,
while 24 liquidated voluntarily or merged (Shull
1971, 34-35).
The reason for citing these statistics for the
1920s is to call attention to an early episode in
Federal Reserve history that contravened the
ancient injunction to central banks to lend only
to illiquid banks, not to insolvent ones, and that
is eerily similar to a current episode. The Fed
apparently learned little from the earlier epi-
sode, since there is even less justification for
the use made of the discount window in the
current t.han in the earlier episode.
The current episode came to light after the
House Banking Committee requested data on all
insured depository institutions that borrowed
funds from the discount window from January
1, 1985, through May 10, 1991. Regulators
grade banks on their performance, according toa scale of I to S. The grades are based on five
measures known by the acronym of CAMEL,
for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Manage-
ment, Earnings, Liquidity) The Federal Reserve
reported that of 530 borrowers from 1985 on
that failed within three years of the onset of
their borrowings, 437 were classified as most
problem-ridden with a CAMEL rating of 5, the
poorest rating; 51 borrowers had the next
lowest rating, CAMEL 4. One borrower with a
CAMEL rating of 5 remained open for as long
as 56 months. The whole class of CAMEL
5-rated institutions were allowed to continue
operations for a mean period of about one year.
At the time of failure, 60 percent of the bor-
rowers had outstanding discount window loans.
These loans were granted almost daily to insti-
tutions with a high probability of insolvency in
the near term, new borrowings rolling over
balances due. In aggregate, the loans of this
group at the time of failure amounted to $8.3
billion, of which $7.9 billion was extended when
the institutions were operating with a CAMEL 5
rating. Three months prior to failure, borrow-
ings of all 530 institutions peaked at $18.1 bil-
lion. Rather than encouraging banks to pursue
strategies to preserve their size, regulators often
encourage institutions that are about to fail to
shrink drastically first, so as to diminish the
pool of assets that have to be liquidated after
closing.
Some observers of bank performance have as-
serted that it is impossible to know whether an
institution that applies for discount window as-
sistance faces a liquidity or solvency problem.
That assertion may be defensible for discount
window lending in the 1920s even though an
estimated 80 percent of long-time borrowers
failed, since CAMEL ratings did not then exist.
Currently, CAMEL ratings 4 and 5 are known
promptly. Why should it be impossible or even
difficult to distinguish between an illiquid and
an insolvent bank?
Support by the Fed for banks with a high
probability of insolvency in the near term is not
the only recurrent problem with the discount
window. Equally troublesome is the history of
actual or proposed Fed capital loans to non-
banks. Such use of the discount window dis-
tracts the Fed’s attention from its monetary
control function. Recent experience reinforces
earlier doubts about the need for the discount
window. The time has come for a truly basic
change: eliminate the discount window and re-
trict the Fed to open market operations.2 This
change would have the added value of obliterat-
ing the symbolic role of the discount rate and
weakening the tendency to regard the Fed as
determining interest rates.
In the rest of this paper, I document the ero-
sion of the historic restriction, at least since the
1930s, of Federal Reserve discount window assis-
tance to liquidity-strained banks on the security
of sound assets. Section 1 deals with lending
operations from the founding until the post-
World War II period, during which loans to
nonbanks first occur. I then discuss Federal
Reserve actions in recent decades that have fur-
ther blurred the distinction between liquidity
and solvency, and also the emergence of various
nonbanks as candidates for discount window as-
sistance. I ask why these developments have oc-
curred when there has been no change in official
declarations of commitment to supply only li-
quidity, not solvency or capital, to individual
banks, not nonbanks (section 2). In the next sec-
‘Brief official descriptions of composite CAMEL 4 and 5 rat-
ings follow:
CAMEL 4 “Institutions in this group have an immoder-
ate volume of serious financial weaknesses or a combi-
nation of other conditions that are unsatisfactory. Major
and serious problems or unsafe and unsound conditions
may exist which are not being satisfactorily addressed or
resolved.”
CAMEL 5 “This category is reserved for institutions
with an extremely high immediate or near-term probability
of failure.”
CAMEL ratings of banks are not uniform from one district
to another. Some New York CAMEL 4 banks may be rated
5 elsewhere.
2This recommendation has been disputed on the ground
that establishing access to the discount window as a right
— not a privilege — administered at a penalty rate would
solve the problems that face the current administration of
the window. It is not clear to me, however, that these
changes would eliminate the problem of political pressures
on the Fed to lend to nonbanks. As for the problem of
loans to insolvent banks, access to the window as a right
at a penalty rate might only result in worsening adverse
selection.
See also Kaufman (1991), who argues that the discount
window is not needed to protect the money supply — the
basic justification for a lender of last resort — and that li-
quidity strains can be mitigated by open market operations
without involving the Fed in discount window assistance.
Credit-worthy banks can borrow at market rates, large ones
in the Fed Funds market, small ones from their correspon-
dent banks.tion I examine the costs of Federal Reserve sup-
port for problem institutions that regulatory
authorities eventually close and for nonhanks
that would otherwise have to meet a market
test (section 3). Finally, I consider whether re-
forms of discount window practices that have
been proposed could remedy the inherent
problems of the mechanism. I comment on pro-
visions in the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991
that may be worthy reform proposals but do
not address these problems (section 4). 1 offer
my conclusions in section 5.
Regulation A—the first one adopted by the
Federal Reserve Board at its creation, in recogni-
tion of the expectation that the discount window
at Federal Reserve Banks would serve as the
main purveyor of member bank reserves—
establishes the rules under which the Banks
may extend credit. Periodically revised, the regu-
lation has consistently set out the procedures
that banks had to follow to gain access to the
discount window. The initial regulation provid-
ed for rediscounting short-term agricultural, in-
dustrial, and commercial paper, defined as
eligible paper. Later, to accommodate Treasury
financing needs in World War I, the Reserve
Banks were empowered to extend direct col-
lateral loans to member banks, occasionally se-
cured by pledge of eligible paper but usually by
obligations of the U.S. government. Until the
1930s, even though the Federal Reserve had be-
come familiar with open market purchases as a
source of member bank reserves, bills discount-
ed usually exceeded U.S. government securities
in Reserve Bank portfolios.
The discount window provided accornmoda-
tion for periods up to 90 days for a non-
agricultural discount or advance collateralized
by eligible paper or government obligations, hut
of up to nine months for agricultural paper. As
noted earlier, continuous borrowing year in and
year out in the 1920s was not uncommon. A
later (1954) Federal Reserve document, deploring
continuous borrowing, noted that “it was possi-
ble by the mid-Thirties to speak of an estab-
lished tradition against member bank reliance
on the discount facility as a supplement to its
resources” (Shull 1971, 41). A similar statement
appears in an internal Federal Reserve history
of the discount mechanism: “extended borrow-
ings by a member bank from its Reserve Bank
would in effect constitute a use of Federal
Reserve credit as a substitute for the member’s
capital” (Hackley 1973, 194). The 1973 version
of Regulation A states, as a general principle,
that “Federal Reserve credit is not a substitute
for capital and ordinarily is not available for ex-
tended periods.” Both the 1980 and 1990 ver-
sions of Regulation A state, as a general require-
ment, that “Federal Reserve credit is not a sub-
stitute for capital.”
A broader statement of the foregoing princi-
ple, covering banks and nonbanks, appeared in
1932 in a conference report by representatives
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who
had met with South American central banks:
“Central banks must not in any way supply cap-
ital on a permanent basis either to member
banks or to the public, which may lack it for
the conduct of their business” (Federal Reserve
Bulletin 1932, 43).
Legislative changes in the administration of
the discount window, made in response to bank
failures in the Great Depression, sometimes ob-
served this advice. The Glass-Steagall Act of
February 27, 1932, authorized Federal Reserve
Banks (in a new section 10(b) added to the Fed-
eral Reserve Act) to make advances to member
banks on their promissory notes secured by
otherwise ineligible collateral, if acceptable to
the Reserve Banks, for periods up to four months
at rates not less than one-half percent per an-
num above the prevailing highest discount rate.
No provision was made for solvency loans of
capital or loans to receivers of closed banks.
Although no provision was made for solvency
loans of capital, the Emergency Relief and Con-
struction Act of July 21, 1932 (in a new section
13(3) added to the Federal Reserve Act), opened
the discount window to nonbanks. It permitted
the Reserve Banks to discount for individuals,
partnerships and corporations, with no other
sources of funds, notes, drafts and bills of ex-
change eligible for discount for member banks.
The New Deal confirmed this type of authority
(in section 403 of Title III of the Emergency
Banking Act of March 9, 1933, that added section
13(13) to the Federal Reserve Act). It allowed
90-day advances to individuals, partnerships and
corporations on the security of direct obliga-
tions of the U.S. government, at interest r’ates
fixed by the Reserve Banks.iti~&~: ~•t(W Dn:iI ~
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Before turning to the New Deal change that
involved Reserve Banks in extending capital
loans to nonbanks, let me review the other
changes in the Emergency Banking Act of 1933.
Title II created conservatorships for national
banks. Section 304 of Title Ill authorized the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, not the
Federal Reserve, to subscribe to preferred stock
“of any national banking association or any
State bank or trust company in need of funds
for capital purposes.” It is significant that Title
IV, referring to the Federal Reserve, conferred
on it no authority to make solvency loans of
capital. Section 402 authorized Federal Reserve
Banks, until March 3, 1934, to make advances in
exceptional and exigent circumstances to mem-
ber banks on their own notes on the security of
any acceptable assets, superseding the provision
regarding advances to member banks in the
February 1932 Glass-Steagall Act. By Presidential
proclamation, this provision, the forerunner of
the present section 10(b), was extended until
March 3, 1935, when it expired (Board Annual
Report 1933, 261-265). The new form of section
10(b) became permanent as part of the Banking
Act of 1935.
I now turn to the New Deal change that
authorized the Federal Reserve to make solvency/
capital loans to nonbanks. The Act of June 19,
1934, added a new section 13(b) to the Federal
Reserve Act, which authorized Reserve Banks
directly or in participation with a member or
nonmember bank to make advances to estab-
lished commercial or industrial enterprises for
the purpose of supplying working capital if the
borrower were unable to obtain assistance from
usual sources. A participating member or non-
member bank had to obligate itself for at least
20 percent of’ any loss. The loans were for peri-
ods up to five years (Board Annual Report 1934,
50-51). Through 1939, the Reserve Banks had
approved 2,800 applications and commitments
amounting to $188 million at rates from 2.5 to 6
percent (Smead 1941, 259). Although the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation then assumed a
more important role in providing working capi-
tal for established businesses, the Reserve Banks
continued to participate, approving an additional
742 applications amounting to $382 million
through 1946 (Board Annual Report 1946, 10).
The aggregate amount of such loans was limit-
ed by law to the surplus of the Reserve Banks
as of July 1, 1934, plus $139 million that the
Treasury was to repay the Banks for their re-
quired subscription to the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation in an amount equal to
one-half of their surplus on January 1, 1933.
The required subscription was stipulated in the
Banking Act of 1933 that created the FDIC
(Board Annual Report 1933, 276-277). A commen-
tator has noted that this “is the only instance in
United States history in which Congress re-
quired the central bank to expend its own
funds to subscribe for more than ad eminirnis
amount of the capital of another unrelated en-
terprise, other than obligations of the Treasury
itself” (Todd 1988, 130). In any event, the
Reserve Banks charged off the value of FDIC
stock on their books in the same calendar year
in which they paid for the subscription. Capital
loans to nonbanks under the authority of sec-
tion 13(b), unlike the FDIC subscription, were
voluntary decisions of the Reserve Banks. In
section 2 below, I note a more recent attempt
by the Treasury that was foiled to require the
Fed to expend its own funds in support of the
FDIC.
Congressional authorization and Federal
Reserve implementation of loans to nonbanks
for use as capital was, in my judgment, a sorry
reflection on both Congress’s and the Fed’s un-
derstanding of the System’s essential monetary
control function. In 1946 the Federal Reserve
Board sought to eliminate its authority under
section 13W) to make loans directly to business
enterprises and replace it with a mandate re-
stricted to guaranteeing such loans. A bill in-
troduced in Congress early in 1947 on the
Board’s behalf would have authorized Reserve
Banks to guarantee, up to a maximum of 90
percent, loans, extended by banks for as long as
10 years to small- and medium-size business en-
terprises, subject to a fee charge that increased
with the guarantee percentage. The bill also
provided for the return of the amounts ad-
vanced by the Treasury (up to $139 million) for
the Banks’ industrial loan operations, and
pledged that no further Treasury appropriations
for this purpose would be required (Board An-
nual Report 1946, 8-10; 1947, 11-12).
Since the bill was not enacted, Reserve Banks
for the next decade continued to make and co-
finance working capital industrial loans. Section
13(b) was finally repealed by the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, under the terms of
which the Reserve Banks restored to the ‘rrea-
sury the amounts it had advanced under section
IQP,262
13W) (Board Annual Report 1958, 95). Chairman
William McChesney Martin, in testimony before
the Subcommittee on Small Business of the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, when
it was considering this bill, stated well the Fed-
eral Reserve’s considered judgment on its ven-
ture into capital industrial loans: Its primary
objective was “guiding monetary and credit poli-
cy,” and “it is undesirable for the Federal
Reserve to provide the capital and participate in
management functions” of the proposed small
business financing institutions (Federal Reserve
Bulletin 1957, 769).
I conclude this survey of Federal Reserve
lending activities since its founding by noting its
support for solvency/capital lending programs
under wartime V-loan authority that it adopted
on April 6, 1942, and revised on September 26,
1950 (Board Annual Report 1942, 89-91; 1950,
72-74). Federal Reserve Banks were authorized
to act on behalf of the guaranteeing agencies
(War Department, Navy Department, etc.) as fis-
cal agents of the United States, meaning, the
Treasury was required to reimburse them for
their outlays. In acting as a guarantor of defense
production loans, the Federal Reserve provided
a model of guaranteeing authority that was
later invoked when bailouts of peacetime enter-
prises were proposed in the 1970s. Those de-
velopments and Federal Reserve lending since
the 1980s to institutions with a high probability
of insolvency in the near term represent a
major departure from its historic mandate to
provide loans to illiquid but not insolvent
depository institutions. In the section that fol-
lows I discuss the apparent change in how the
Federal Reserve regards its mandate.
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An appropriate starting point is the official
response to financial problems of the Penn Cen-
tral Railroad that surfaced in 1970. Though it
did not lead to discount window assistance,
nonetheless it reveals clearly the pressures that
were to lead to such a practice. The Nixon Ad-
ministration proposed to give the company a V-
loan as a bailout. However, for the loan to be of
any use, legislative approval was required, since
guarantees of loans for defense production were
to expire on June 30. When legislation stalled in
Congress, the Administration requested the Fed-
eral Reserve Board to authorize the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to give the company
discount window assistance. The request was
rejected and, as a result, the company filed for
bankruptcy on June 21, 1970. On June 30, Con-
gress approved a Joint Resolution, extending the
Defense Production Act but limiting the maxi-
mum obligation of any guaranteeing agency (for
example, the Federal Reserve) to $20 million,
and stipulating that “The authority conferred by
this section shall not be used primarily to pre-
vent the financial insolvency or bankruptcy of
any person, unless” the President certifies “a
direct and substantially adverse effect upon
defense production” (Federal Reserve Bulletin
1970, 720).
If the incident had ended at this point, it
would have been remembered primarily as a
political dispute between the Administration and
the Congress. Penn Central’s bankruptcy would
have been regarded simply as the key to the
restructuring of its operations. Instead, the Fed-
eral Reserve reacted as though the company’s
default on $82 million of commercial paper it
had outstanding would generate a financial cri-
sis. The Federal Reserve assumed that lenders
would not discriminate between a troubled issuer
and other perfectly sound issuers of commercial
paper, so that the latter would be unable to roll
over their issues. “It was made clear that the
Federal Reserve discount window would be
available to assist banks in meeting the needs of
businesses unable to roll over maturing com-
mercial paper” (Board Annual Report 1970, 18).
However, commer’cial paper issuers that faced
difficulties did so not because of the condition
of the market as such, but because of condi-
tions peculiar to themselves (for example, Chrys-
ler Financial and Commercial Credit) (Carron
1982, 398). The fully justified verdict of the
1971 Economic Report of the President (69) was
that no “genuine liquidity crisis existed in
mid-1970.”
The Penn Central episode fostered the view
that bankruptcy proceedings by a large firm
created a financial crisis, and that, if possible,
bankruptcy should be prevented by loans and
loan guarantees: the “too big to fail” doctrine in
embryo.
The financial difficulties faced by New York
City in 1975 led the Federal Reserve to informCongress of its response to suggestions that it
might serve as a source of emergency credit.
Governor George W. Mitchell cautioned “against
any proposals that would provide direct access
to central bank credit by hard-pressed govern-
mental units” (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1975, 410).
Chairman Arthur F. Burns reiterated that caution
and reported on contingency plans to increase
temporary discount window lending to commer-
cial banks in the event of a major municipal
default. However, he added that if a default ulti-
mately required “write-downs that could seri-
ously impair the capital of some banks,” the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, not the
Federal Reserve, had statutory powers to assist
federally insured banks that found their capital
impaired (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1975, 635-636).
In the end, Congress passed a law guaranteeing
New York City loans of up to $2.3 billion in
1975, reduced to $1.65 billion in 1978, but the
Federal Reserve’s involvement in the rescue ar-
rangement was only limited fiscal agency serv-
ices.3 The Fed also acted as fiscal agent for
Treasury loan guarantees issued during the
bailouts of the Lockheed (1971) and Chrysler
(1979) corporations.4
I have been unable to find any reference to
the Fed’s involvement in these three loan guaran-
tees in any of its publications. By consulting the
U.S. Code—a source for lawyers, not econo-
mists—however, I have been able to ferret out
the details of that involvement. My guess is that
the Fed was unwilling to publicize its role be-
cause it was not voluntary.
The most recent attempt to use the discount
window to assist a nonbank involved the FDIC.
In March 1991, the FDIC chairman, William
Seidman, requested Congressional authorization
for a direct loan of $25 billion by the Federal
Reserve to the Bank Insurance Fund. Chairman
Alan Greenspan, testifying before the Senate
Banking Committee the next month, opposed
such a loan. That did not deter Treasury Under
Secretary for Domestic Finance Robert Glauber
from renewing the request in testimony on May
29, 1991, before a subcommittee of the House
Ways and Means Committee. The Federal
Reserve’s required subscription to the FDIC on
its establishment in his view served as a prece-
dent. The FDIC recapitalization and banking re-
form bill that the Treasury prepared included
provisions authorizing the FDIC to borrow $25
billion from the Federal Reserve Banks and
amending section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act,
authorizing any Federal Reserve Bank “to make
advances to the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, upon its request” (Treasury bill 1991,
sec. 402, 245). The July 23, 1991, bill prepared
by the House Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs did not include those provi-
sions (H.R.6, 102nd Cong., 1st sess.). The final
legislation, the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991,
follows the House bill in increasing from $5 bil-
lion to $30 billion the FDIC’s authority to bor-
row directly from the Treasury, not from the
Fed.
Despite the restraint in the Act with respect
to recapitalizing the FDJC, restraint is absent
from another provision. The Act amended Sec-
tion 13 of the Federal Reserve Act that deals
with the Federal Reserve’s authority to discount
for nonbanks. The amendment eliminated the
requirement that the notes, drafts or bills ten-
dered by nonbanks be eligible for discount by
member banks. As interpreted by Sullivan &
Cromwell, a New York law firm, for its clients
in a memorandum of December 2, 1991, this
provision enables the Fed to lend directly to
security firms in emergency situations. Tradi-
tionally, commercial banks, knowing they had
access to the discount window, have lent to
brokerage firms and others short of cash in a
stock market crash. It is not clear why the
traditional practice was deemed unsatisfactory.
In my view, the provision in the FDIC Improve-
ment Act of 1991 portends expanded misuse of
the discount window.
To this date, the Fed has apparently been a
reluctant participant in loans and loan guaran-
tees to nonbanks. The question must be asked
whether it will be firm in the future in resisting
pressures to fund insolvent firms that are politi-
cally well-connected.
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In 1974 the Federal Reserve behaved contrary
to traditional principles when uninsured deposi-
tors started a run on the Franklin National Bank
after news surfaced that it had large foreign ex-
change losses.The Comptroller of the Currency
did not close it promptly. The decision of the
4See U.S. Code (1971) for Lockheed and U.S. Code (1980)
for Chrysler.
3See U.S. Code (1975, 1978).regulators was that the Federal Reserve discount
window, starting in May, would provide loans
until the FDIC found a purchaser of the failed
institution. Over the next five months, the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York lent continuous-
ly to Franklin; the maximum amount lent, on
October 7, 1974, was $1.75 billion, representing
nearly one-half of Franklin’s assets. On October
8, the hank was declared insolvent and taken
over by a foreign consortium.
Among the precedents established by discount
window lending to Franklin National was that
its London branch assets were accepted as col-
lateral, and that, for the first time, the borrow-
ings covered withdrawals from the London
branch as well as Franklin’s domestic branches.
Although, on one hand, Fr’anklin National simply
borrowed at the discount rate, what was un-
usual in this episode was that in September
1974 the Federal Reserve assumed responsibility
to execute Franklin’s existing foreign exchange
contracts, since bidders for the bank were un-
willing to honor them. it also agreed to extend
discount window assistance, if needed, to the
purchasing bank. The FDIC, moreover, did not
immediately repay the discount window loan—
its normal practice—but signed a three-year
note obligating itself to do so as the collateral
Franklin supplied was liquidated. In effect, the
Federal Reserve lent capital funds that the in-
surance agency contributed to the purchasing
bank. The interest cost to the F’ed of subsidizing
loans to Franklin has been estimated at $20 mil-
lion (Garcia and Plautz 1988, 228). In executing
Franklin’s foreign exchange contracts, the Fed
also incurred opportunity costs of staff time and
lost interest on part of its portfolio.
The rescue of Franklin National Bank shifted
discount window use from short-term liquidity
assistance to long-term support of an insolvent
institution pending final resolution of its prob-
lems. The bank was insolvent when its borrow-
ing began and insolvent when its borrowing
ended. ‘rhe loans merely replaced funds that
depositors withdrew, the inflow from the
Reserve Bank matching withdrawals.
The undeclared insolvency of Continental Il-
linois in 1984 was also papered over by exten-
sive discount window lending from May 1984 to
February 1985, albeit with smaller subsidies
than in the case of Franklin National—an amend-
ment to Regulation A as of September 25, 1974,
permitted application of a special rate on emer-
gency credit after eight weeks that was closer
to a market rate. The borrowing covering Con-
tinental’s holding company as well as the bank
at some dates amounted to as much as $8 billion.
Again the FDIC assumed the bank’s loan, which
it eventually repaid from the proceeds of liq-
uidating the bank’s assets, concluding with one
large $2.1 billion payment in September 1989—
an enormous cash drain.
The discount window has been valued by the
Federal Reserve as a mechanism for directing
funds to an individual bank with liquidity
problems. It regarded its loans to Franklin Na-
tional and Continental Illinois as exceptional oc-
currences. However, when hundreds of CAMEL
4- and 5-rated banks, as noted at the beginning
of this paper, were receiving extended accom-
modation even though they faced a high proba-
bility of near-term failure, discounting can no
longer be regarded simply as a means of provid-
ing temporary liquidity. What explains this
transformation in practice?
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in the United States, with federal spending
budgeted at an all-time high, policy makers see
the discount window as a mechanism for
providing funds off budget. Legislation is neces-
sary to authorize the Fed to provide assistance
to favored nonbanks, so the use of the window
isn’t kept secret, but it may seem a cost-free
way of funding them because repayment can be
rolled forward indefinitely. ‘rhis may explain
the recent spate of efforts to use discount win-
dow assistance for nonbanks.
With respect to loans to banks with a high
probability of insolvency in the near term, it is
noteworthy that in 1974 only four banks failed.
By the late I980s, failures were numbered in
triple digits, and the FDJC’s problem banks, in
four digits. Having once set the precedent of
lending to such problem institutions, at least
two explanations may account fox- this practice
by the Federal Reserve: (1) As in the case of
Franklin and Continental Illinois Banks, its ac-
tions may have been taken at the bidding of the
FDIC, or perhaps on its own initiative, in order
to mitigate the FDIC’s plight. (2) The Federal
Reserve may regard failure of a large institution
as potentially triggering a financial collapse or a
run on the dollar. Fear of contagion may have
become the Federal Reserve’s overriding
concern.Even if these explanations account for the
change in Federal Reserve discount window
practice, neither may justify the change. Before
dealing with this issue, it is important to assess
the costs of wholesale discount window lending
to insolvent institutions, to which I now turn.
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For the Fed to lend directly to the Treasury
or to government agencies that the Treasury
would otherwise fund through regular ap-
propriations is a slippery slope. The costs are
politicization of the money supply process. The
Fed’s charter wisely prohibits such lending.
Discount window accommodation to insolvent
institutions, whether banks or nonbanks, misal-
locates resources. Political decisions substitute
for market decisions. Institutions that have
failed the market test of viability should not be
supported by the Fed’s money issues.
A depository institution traditionally was said
to be eligible for discount window assistance
when it was illiquid but solvent. In recent
years, it has been given assistance when it was
liquid but its insolvency was undeclared. On a
market value basis, an institution is insolvent
when assets are less than liabilities. Since book
values are the usual measure of assets and lia-
bilities, the divergence between assets and liabil-
ities may only be revealed long after the market
value of its assets has fallen below the market
value of its liabilities. In addition, an institution
may be liquid but insolvent, so long as its cash
flow is positive.
A decision to declare an institution insolvent is
the prerogative of the chartering agency: the
Comptroller of the Currency for national banks,
state authorities for state-chartered banks su-
pervised by the Fed and the FDIC. The FDIC,
since 1989, however, can both remove deposit
insurance and substitute itself as receiver of
state banks. It can force a state to close banks
and, as the thrift insurer, close insolvent in-
sured thrifts. (It does not have authority to
close credit unions.) If the chartering agency
has delayed closure, the Federal Reserve has
acted as if a troubled institution is entitled to
discount window assistance provided it can fur-
nish acceptable collateral. The question I raise is
whether the Federal Reserve’s position is defen-
sible when inferior CAMEL ratings provide in-
dependent evidence on the likelihood of insol-
vency in the near or immediate future.
Since the Federal Reserve routinely sterilizes
discount window reserve infusions, does it
make any difference whether the reserves are
provided to solvent or insolvent banks or
whether the period for which the reserves are
provided is limited or extended? After all, if the
reserves were not made available through the
discount window, open market purchases would
add an equivalent reserve contribution to the
banking system.
I believe that it does make a difference
whether reserves are injected by open market
purchases or by discount window lending, espe-
cially if insolvent banks are permitted to bor-
row for extended periods. Discount window
lending may not affect proposed monetary
growth, but it has other effects that make it an
undesirable source of reserves.
Open market operations are anonymous. The
market allocates reserve injections or withdraw-
als among participants according to their xela-
tive size and current opportunities. Much
greater discretion is exercised by the Federal
Reserve in the allocation of reserves through
discounting, since the Fed knows the institu-
tions that request discount accommodation. The
public learns about the magnitude of both open
market operations and discount window credit
from the data the Federal Reserve publishes,
hut it does not learn the names of the banks
that received loans. The data made available to
the House Banking Committee in 1991 revealed
the names of the institutions that had failed
despite extended discount window loans, but
not the names of the few banks that had
received such loans but had not failed.~The
secrecy may be good public policy, but it leaves
open the question whether provision of loans
on a case-by-case basis assures equal treatment
for all. This is an argument against discount
window lending in general, not specifically to
insolvent banks, an argument that has often
been made in the past without reference to the
specific problem of insolvent banks (for exam-
ple, Friedman 1960, 38).
~ltwas only extended credit borrowers that failed in the data
the House Banking Committee obtained from the Fed in
1991. Banks that obtained seasonal credit at the win-
dow did not fail. As footnote 2 on page 59 contends, the
discount window is not essential for this use.Since the 1970s, the Federal Reserve has ex-
tended long-term discount window assistance to
depository institutions that by objective stan-
dards were likely to fail. It has done so in the
belief that, in the absence of such assistance,
contagious effects would spread from the trou-
bled institutions to sound ones. The belief is
particularly entrenched for large troubled inter-
mediaries, reflecting an apprehension that halt-
ing the operation of such institutions would
have dire unsettling effects on financial mar-
kets. Before 1985, the goal of such discount
window assistance was a restructuring of the
problem institution as a viable entity with both
insured and uninsured deposits made whole.
That was the situation in 1984 when Con-
tinental Illinois was rescued. The implication
was that any other response would have
brought on contagion. Yet if the bank had been
closed before its net worth turned negative, the
institutional depositors, foreign bank depositor-s
and creditors who ran on it might well have
redeposited their withdrawals elsewhere or
bought financial assets to replace the certificates
of deposit Continental issued and that they
were no longer willing to buy. Even if some in-
terbank depositors that held as much as half
their equity in uninsured deposits at Continental
had obtained only a fraction of their claims im-
mediately upon the closing, they would ulti-
mately have recovered the full nominal value of
their claims after liquidation of the bank.~The
market would have known that the claimants
on Continental were not in jeopardy. Even if
closing Continental had led to runs on the for-
eign interbank depositors — ostensibly the rea-
son for keeping Continental in operation — the
lenders of last resort in the nations concerned
could have provided adequate liquidity in their
markets to tide the banks over if the Continen-
tal deposits were their only problem. Fear of
contagion should not determine a regulator’s de-
cision to keep an insolvent bank open. It should
lead the Fed to lend to the market to prevent
the contagion.
If fear of contagion is a lesson the Federal
Reserve has learned from the banking panics of
1930-33, it is the wrong lesson. Contagion then
occurred in an environment in which the Fed
permitted the money supply to decline drastical-
ly, rendering banks insolvent not because of
their own actions but simply because of the col-
lapsing economy. The right lesson is that con-
tagion need not arise if open market purchases
are made adequate both to reassure the market
and to prevent a collapse in the quantity of
money. Examples are the Fed’s provision of li-
quidity to cushion the economy from the effects
of the 1987 stock market crash and the collapse
of Drexel Burnham.
Since 1985, prolonged discount window as-
sistance has generally terminated not with re-
structuring but with closure of the insolvent
banks. When banks are known to be insolvent,
postponement of recognition of losses that have
occurred might well have increased current
losses. Uninsured depositors have more time to
withdraw their funds. The insurance agency,
which is to say the taxpayer, ultimately bears
any added costs of delayed closure. By lending
to the banks in question, the Federal Reserve
encourages this practice. Absent regulatory re-
straints or incentives to the contrary, the policy
clearly encourages risk-taking and invites moral
hazard problems. If a bank with the least
desirable CAMEL rating can obtain subsidized
discount window assistance, that institution ob-
tains a competitive advantage over solvent ones
for as long as the Federal Reserve supports it.~
The Federal Reserve Banks decide whether
they will extend a loan on the basis of collateral
that the would-be borrowers offer. This deci-
sion is undoubtedly influenced by the condition
of the insurance agency: whether it has the
funds to pay off depositors and take over the
failing bank’s assets when it cannot arrange a
merger of an insolvent bank with a solvent one
or arrange removal of existing management by
placing an institution in receivership. The condi-
tion of the insurance agency in turn is also af-
fected by a chartering agency’s forbearance or
prompt action in declaring the insolvency of
one of its constituents. The Federal Reserve has
cooperated by extending long-term support to
an institution with a high probability of failure
until a resolution of its problems was arrived at.
Discount window lending to insolvent banks
might cease if, under the terms of the FDIC lm-
GThis assumes that the bank’s value would have been real- compared to what deposit brokers and other non-Fed
ized in a forced sale of assets. sources of funds would charge if the dying banks were left
‘The subsidized rate may have risen to take into account to fend for themselves in the market.
rates on market sources of funds but it is still a subsidy67
provement Act of 1991, the Fed no longer ad-
vanced funds to keep critically undercapitalized
institutions in operation, and the insurance
agency took prompt corrective action to appoint
a receiver for those institutions.~
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Would discontinuation of Fed lending to insol-
vent banks establish the inviolability of the dis-
count window? For many reasons that is not
the case.
Regardless of one’s attitude to discount win-
dow lending for seasonal and adjustment
purposes—the private sector could accommodate
those needs—many economists customarily as-
sign one indispensable function to the discount
window, namely, as lender of last resort: The
Federal Reserve should use discounting in “ex-
ceptional circumstances” (in the words of Regu-
lation A) to provide extended credit to solvent
institutions with liquidity problems.
However, the Federal Reserve does not need
the window to serve as a lender of last resort.
The case against operation of the discount win-
dow has rested on grounds that open market
operations are sufficient for the execution of
monetary policy in both ordinary and exception-
al circumstances, that individual banks that
need and can justify special assistance can
receive such assistance through the federal
funds market, and that discounting invites dis-
cretionary subsidies to banks favored by the
Fed (Goodfriend and King 1988, 216-53).
There is still another reason that the discount
window serves no useful purpose. A review of
the use of the discount mechanism by the Fed-
eral Reserve since its founding demonstrates a
series of misconceptions on its part about what
it can achieve by affording banks the opportuni-
ty to acquire borrowed reserves. The miscon-
ceptions have varied over time, depending on
the objectives the System pursued.
Let me note some of the misconceptions:
(1) The Federal Reserve can determine whether
borrowed reserves serve “productive” rather
than “speculative” use of credit.
(2) Banks borrow only for “need” and not for
profit.
(3) The absolute level of free reserves or bor-
rowings indicates whether banks choose to
acquire or liquidate assets.
(4) The spread between discount rates and mar-
ket rates does not affect bank borrowing.
(5) The tradition against continuous borrowing
is a satisfactory substitute for a penalty dis-
count rate.
(6) Borrowing by banks signals bank weakness.
(7) Little bank borrowing signifies money mar-
ket ease.
(8) “Technical” adjustments may explain discount
rate changes, but their announcement con-
veys useful information to financial markets.
(9) Banks can be dissuaded from excessive use
of the discount window by Reserve Bank ap-
peals and exhortations instead of discount
rate increases.
Since the 1970s, the Federal Reserve has acted
on the belief that discount window assistance to
banks with a high probability of insolvency in
the near term, especially large ones, will, by
delaying closure, eliminate contagious effects on
financial markets.
In practice, the Federal Reserve’s discount
window activities have created perverse incen-
tives, shifting risk from depositors to taxpayers.
If a threat of systemic bank failures did arise,
the Fed should counter it by open market oper-
ations, rather than by assistance to individual
institutions. However, if the Federal Reserve
prevents serious declines in the money supply,
it is highly unlikely that the failure of an in-
dividual bank, however large, would trigger sys-
temic bank failures.
Closing the discount window would ft-ce the
Fed not only from likely future misconceptions
but also from the recurrent pressures, to which
it has been subject since the New Deal, to ac-
commodate nonbanks, not to mention pressures
from the Treasury to fund government agencies
off budget.
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I’ve surveyed the changes in Federal Reserve
discount window practices since the System’s
founding. Early on the System emphasized that
8For an alternative view of the possible consequences of a
prompt corrective action strategy, see A. Alton Gilbert
(1991).borrowing was supposed to he limited to short- effects of its actions. These mistakes have
term reserve needs. By the I 980s, hundreds of
banks rated by regulators as having a high
probability of failure in the near term and
which ultimately failed were receiving extended
accommodation at the discount window.
My reading of this recent experience is that
the change in discount window practices, by
delaying closure of failed institutions, increased
the losses the FDJC and ultimately taxpayers
bore.~Recent legislation limits use of the dis-
count window for long-term loans to troubled
banks. More important, it also provides that a
supervisory agency is to appoint a receiver for
an institution that falls below a critical capital
ratio, curtailing the regulator’s discretion
regarding when to intervene in the case of an
undercapitalized bank.
These changes, even if implemented—it is not
yet known whether they will be—do not sanctify
the continued operation of the discount window.
Individual banks that need assistance, if credit-
worthy, can obtain loans without subsidies from
the federal funds market. The Fed can be an ef-
fective lender of last resort if restricted to open
market operations. In administering the discount
window, the Fed has been prone to mistake the
marred its execution of monetary policy.
Without a discount window, the Fed will
avoid pressures to lend off budget to nonbanks
and to government agencies, which should be
funded thi-ough regulax appropriations. Without
the distraction of monitoring collateral and
deciding which bank applicants qualified for
assistance, it can concentrate its energies on
open market operations, the single instrument it
needs to control the quantity of money. Without
a discount window, there will he no announce-
ment effects since the Fed will not have to set
the discount rate. That should dispel the im-
pression that it controls market interest rates.
A Federal Reserve System without the discount
window would he a better functioning institution.
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began. With the value of liabilities greater than of earning
assets in these institutions, the gap grew as interest in-
curred on liabilities exceeded earnings on assets.
Delay, moreover, allowed outflows of uninsured deposits.
Had the institutions been closed promptly, the earnings
deficiency could have been offset at least somewhat by
reducing the principal paid to uninsured depositors. Even
so, at the closing, Bank of New England held $2.3 billion
in uninsured deposits, of which $1.25 billion were brokered.
At their peak, Fed advances amounted to $2.26 billion, The
FDIC’s loss was $2.5 billion. As L. William Seidman testi-
fied, the FDIC decided to protect all depositors of the Bank
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million in uninsured deposits. The FDIC’s final loss was
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uidates failed banks but also in cases in which it arranges
some form of purchase and assumption. When it liquidates
a failed bank, the FDIC pays depositors the face value of
their claims and suffers a reduction in its reserves meas-
ured by the full difference between book and current
values of the assets that support the deposits. When it ar-
ranges a purchase and assumption, it transfers the
deposits to the buyer and, depending on the purchase
price it has accepted, the FDIC is responsible for the re-
maining difference between book and current values of as-
sets that support the deposits transferred.
In my opinion, delay in recognizing losses that already
exist cannot be justified by the claim that the FDIC uses
the time to improve the behavior of the bankrupt institu-
tion, even if it were true that supervisors would be suc-
cessful at this late date in the institution’s history in
reforming it. Delay may, however, be helpful to the FDIC’s
public image by postponing a publicly disclosed decline in
the stated value of the reserves in the fund. That may be
the real reason the FDIC welcomes delay.
The FDIC has stated that the value of a bank to potential
bidders goes down when it is already involved in resolving
a failed bank case, as if that would validate delay. In fact,
it is the difference between book and market value of a
bank’s assets which a potential bidder learns that accounts
for any decline in the bank’s value, not the fact that an ef-
fort at resolution is under way.
What needs to be explained is why the Fed is the tender
and not the FDIC, which has had the authority since 1982
to lend to open bankrupt banks and since 1989 to conser-
vators. Some buyers might argue that assets are worth
more if FDIC can step in after it has fixed a price in a pur-
chase and assumption transaction and abrogates contracts
the institution has with third parties, e.g., for rent, utilities,
etc. That would be harder to do legally if the FDIC already
controlled the bank or had an outstanding loan to it. That
is not an argument that should encourage the Fed to lend
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